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Markets from meaning: quality 
uncertainty and the intersubjective 
construction of value
Jens Beckert* 
This article explores price formation in markets where quality cannot be based on 
intrinsic characteristics of the good exchanged. In such markets, quality uncertainty 
is not an information problem as described by Akerlof in the market for lemons 
model. Instead, defining quality is a problem of contingent assessments that are 
arrived at intersubjectively through discursive practices and mutual observation of 
market participants. Quality is endogenous to the market process. Institutions and 
conventions play an important role, much as they do in the market for lemons 
model, but their function is to generate confidence rather than trust. Prices emerge 
in such markets from a combination of intersubjectively established quality assess-
ments, institutions and existing structural characteristics of the market. I call this 
the markets from meaning model, which I develop based on the art market and ex-
pand to capital investments and financial speculation.
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1. Introduction
This article relates quality and uncertainty. The existence of goods whose qualities 
are not inherent in the product but intersubjectively determined poses important and 
interesting problems for the theory of markets. The recognition of the intersubjective 
determination of quality may enhance our understanding of preference building and 
price formation on markets. It may also explain important institutions observable on 
markets.
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There are many markets in which prices are hardly based on qualities inherent in the 
product. For instance, consumer markets like those for wine, fashion, sporting events 
or travel destinations, where value is based largely on symbolic qualities. Other mar-
kets—like the car market, the market for smartphones or housing markets—are more 
mixed in the sense that the value of products is more strongly anchored in material 
qualities but also, in significant ways, in symbolic ones. If quality is not to be under-
stood from the materiality of the object, neither sellers nor purchasers can infer prices 
from inspecting intrinsic characteristics and comparing them to those of similar prod-
ucts. Nevertheless, some products sold in such markets fetch very high prices, consti-
tuting large price differences between products that may look very similar in terms of 
their material characteristics.
In other important markets, product quality cannot be known in the present because 
it depends on future developments, which are not yet knowable. This holds for all cap-
ital investments and financial markets where actors need to make decisions despite the 
uncertainty of future outcomes.
If looking at qualities intrinsic to the object were the only way to determine value, 
uncertainty in these markets would be so excessive that demand would be random and 
low. Markets for these products would fail because price differences would be unintel-
ligible and the uncertainty would be on overload. To understand the prices for these 
products, we must look at how actors assess their quality. I argue that the judgements 
of quality by actors are social in character; they are based on intersubjective processes 
that unfold between market participants and are anchored in evolving institutions.1 
I will call this the markets from meaning model.
The article aims at demonstrating the sociological contribution to a theory of value 
and price. The art market is used as a finger exercise to develop these thoughts. This 
market is chosen not for its economic importance, but because it clearly exhibits 
the mechanisms identified. In the latter parts of the article, the systematic consider-
ations are extended to capital investments and speculation on financial markets which 
brings the uncertainty caused by the openness of the future to the centre of attention. 
Extending the model into financial markets in this way will highlight its broader sig-
nificance for the economy.
2. Art as an example of the model
2.1 The art market
In 2004, the Saatchi Gallery in London sold a tiger shark preserved in formaldehyde 
to an art collector for the estimated sum of eight million dollars. The purchase of this 
work, created in 1991 by British artist Damien Hirst, is just one example of the high 
price some art fetches on the market. It is clear that the price of eight million dollars 
is not explained by production costs for the piece, which the artist estimated at 50,000 
dollars.2
1 See also the contributions in Fullbrock (2002).
2 See also for this example Thompson (2008). Thompson’s discussion of the art market uses the concept 
of branding to explain price differences. Although there are many overlaps with the argument developed in 
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The art market is not an example of a market in which asymmetric information 
creates the uncertainty regarding quality. In the market for lemons model (Akerlof, 
1970), asymmetric distribution of information regarding the inherent quality of the 
product leads to market failure because buyers are only willing to pay for average 
quality, causing sellers to withdraw above-average-quality products from the market 
and thus creating a downward spiral of quality deterioration of market supply. In the 
lemons market, product quality can be determined objectively because it is intrinsic 
to the object; uncertainty is an information problem.3 This holds for other markets as 
well, for instance commodity markets, markets for computer hardware or for building 
materials and more generally: markets for products that are valued for a technical 
performance, which can be objectively established and ‘inspected’ by scrutinising the 
product.4 Uncertainty in the art market, however, is different. Sellers and buyers may 
already have full information on all the inherent qualities of the piece: the size, the ma-
terials used, when it was produced, what it depicts, its restoration state and the name 
of the artist. They nevertheless may not be able to assess its quality.
The source of uncertainty in the art market, then, is the independence of the quality 
assessment of the object from (most) of its intrinsic properties.5 This phenomenon 
arises from the immateriality of what qualifies as quality (Beckert and Rössel, 2013) 
and, one can assume, is also at the root of the perplexity or even resentment in public 
opinion in response to deals like Hirst’s shark. To any outsider, art market prices are 
completely opaque. What is the basis for such a high price, or for any price in this 
market, for that matter?
Imagine yourself in an auction house that sells works from different artists and let 
us assume that the auction house would not provide price estimates for the art works. 
After being given the opportunity to inspect the individual pieces carefully, you are 
asked to bid on them. Any non-specialist in the field would be at a complete loss in this 
situation: if there were bids at all, they would be random and low, at least if measured 
against the high prices actually paid for the work of some artists.6 If only the intrinsic 
qualities of the artwork were under consideration, neither the high prices for some 
artworks nor the wide price differences between artists could be justified. Uncertainty 
would be paramount. The art market would fail, eliminating most of the revenues it 
currently generates.
3 The explicit reference in this article to Akerlof (1970) as a contrasting model does not mean that I follow 
Akerlof’s functionalist explanation of institutions as being designed as a response to market failures (for a 
critique, see Fine and Milonakis 2009). For this, see also Section 3.
4 This distinction is an analytical one. In many markets, symbolic qualities and inherent material product 
qualities come together in the assessment of quality. An example is the car market, where brands are valued 
not just for their technically superior qualities but also for their image. The image of a brand is the result of 
intersubjectively constituted meaning of the product. Experts often have a better understanding of actual 
material differences, making consumers vulnerable to marketing strategies that build on symbolic value.
5 One may argue that inspectable qualities are not completely irrelevant. Materials can be so expensive 
that they explain parts of the price, and the authenticity of an artwork is also an inherent quality (though the 
value of authenticity is not).
6 A natural experiment on this was conducted in 2014 by the British street artist Banksy, who set up a 
pop-up stall in New York’s Central Park among the souvenir stands lining the sidewalk, selling authentic 
works by the artist—which would have cost several ten thousand dollars each in a gallery—for 60 dollars 
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2.2 The market field
In the art market, quality is an intersubjective property that emerges from the con-
tingent assessment of the artworks by the actors in the market and does not exist 
independently from it.7 Interactions between actors allow the artistic significance 
of an artist or one of the artworks by that artist to be evaluated and for quality to 
be assessed.8 The discursively established evaluations provide justification for prices 
(Boltanski and Esquerre, 2016).
Quality is the outcome of judgements of artworks by relevant actors in the market. 
The actors relevant in the art market are not just buyers (museums, private collectors) 
and sellers (artists, galleries, auction houses), but also intermediaries, especially mu-
seum curators, art schools, art consultants, art historians, prize juries, art journalists 
and foundations conserving the oeuvres of late artists. Any actor recognised in the 
market as relevant in the judgement of the quality of an artwork could be added to this 
list (Bourdieu, [1992] 1996, p. 229). This plurality of relevant actors orienting their 
actions to one another is defined as a field (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Bourdieu, 
[1992] 1996; Fligstein and McAdam, 2012).
In a field actors struggle for positions—for the artworks and for themselves—by 
evaluating artists through both discourse and decision-making: talking about artists, 
purchasing artworks, pricing those artworks, adding them to a collection, exhibiting 
them, recommending them to a potential purchaser, writing about them in public 
media, analysing them within the context of art history, granting a diploma or an 
award to an artist, etc. The field of art consists of a narrative web that offers evaluations 
from different perspectives.
Actors mutually observe one another’s evaluations and decisions. Evaluations are 
based on judgements regarding the artistic value of an artwork and its potential to ap-
preciate in value. Art collectors, gallery owners, museum curators, journalists, etc. form 
their judgements by observing judgements from other actors in the field. The model 
assumes a process in which quality assessments are influenced by the observation of 
the assessments of others, that is, on ‘second order observations’ (Luhmann, 1995). 
Collectors observe other collectors and museum curators, taking note of the price de-
velopment of the artist’s work, the books published and the articles written about the 
artist. Galleries observe the development of the artist’s oeuvre, taking note of other 
galleries, media reports on the artist, auction results, declarations of interest from mu-
seums and collectors, small talk at art fairs, sales figures, etc. These assessments in turn 
contribute to the judgements by all the other market actors who are observing them. 
Assessing quality is ‘a game of reflecting mirrors’ (Moulin, 1986, p. 374).9
7 This also implies the vulnerability of value in such markets. If the assessment of quality of an artist 
changes in the field, the value of his artworks implodes. Value has no anchor outside its intersubjective 
construction. On the other hand, goods that are considered ‘rubbish’ (Thompson, 1979) can re-emerge as 
valued antiques, vintage cars or rediscovered artists, due to changing sentiments in the field.
8 My interest in the discussion here is primarily the artistic value and not the investment value of art, 
though art-markets focus increasingly on the latter. The investment value is discussed in Section 4, using 
financial assets as prime example.
9 This stands close—but is not identical—to the notion of intersubjectivity developed by John Davis 
(2002). According to Davis, the intentions of individuals are mediated by their attributions of the intentions 
of the collective. My reasoning stands in the pragmatist tradition (Mead, [1934] 1967), emphasising that the 
individual encounters others not as a homogenised collectivity, but rather as a plurality of individuals and 
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Not all actors have the same weight. The assessments being made have more or 
less influence on the other actors’ judgements, depending on the credibility of the 
speaker. Credibility is based on reputation (status) and pecuniary power. It structures 
the field hierarchically. Quality thus also depends on the status rank of the actors ut-
tering judgements (Podolny, 1994; Aspers, 2009). Status is gained from a history of 
verifiably ‘correct’ judgements, which is in fact an assumed influence over the judge-
ment of others.
The role of status in the field can be identified quite easily: Having been selected to 
exhibit at the documenta in Kassel or the Biennale in Venice sends a different signal to 
other market actors than the exhibition of the work in a local and widely unknown gal-
lery. Being represented by an internationally acclaimed gallery like the Saatchi Gallery 
provides attention in the field that representation by a largely unknown gallery does 
not. Having been added to the collection of a famous museum sends a different signal 
than when a work is purchased by an unknown collector. Status stems from earlier en-
gagement in the market and can be seen as a form of institutionalisation anchored in 
sedimentation. Status reflects symbolic capital. Seen from a behavioural perspective, 
status can be interpreted as a heuristic: actors deal with the uncertainty of quality by 
anchoring their assessments in perceived status differences, which are read as infor-
mation from which to make inferences regarding quality (Heiner, 1983; Ariely, 2008; 
Kahneman, 2011).
Pecuniary power is relevant for influencing evaluations in the field as well. Having 
the means and being willing to actually purchase a specific artwork at a given price 
supports a judgement by turning the proclaimed value into a market price. High sale 
prices are themselves read as a signal of quality (Stiglitz, 1987) and thus feed back into 
quality assessments. Pecuniary power reflects economic capital.
The quality judgements by the actors in the field are informed by the judgements of 
the other actors observed (and discursively engaged with) and the weight these actors 
have, conveyed by their status and power. In this sense, quality assessments express the 
structure of the field (Bourdieu, [1992] 1996).
Based on mutual observations of judgements and decisions, ‘islands’ of overlapping 
meaning emerge where actors converge in their assessment of an artist. Since these as-
sessments are shared as narratives in the field, converging aesthetic accounts emerge. 
As Blumer (1969, p. 279) remarked with regard to fashion: By ‘virtue of their intense 
immersion in this world[,] the buyers came to develop common sensitivities and similar 
appreciations’. The assessments formed by economic agents constitute a ‘collective be-
lief ’ (Durkheim, [1912] 1965). With reference to Ludwik Fleck’s ([1935] 1979) notion 
of thought collectives, one could speak of ‘valuation collectives’. It is through the (par-
tial) shared assessments of quality that quality uncertainty is reduced (Orléan, 2012, 
p. 13) and commitments to purchases emerge. The consensus emerging can be seen 
as a ‘meso-level social order in which actors (who can be individual or collective) are 
attuned to and interact with one another on the basis of shared (which is not to say 
consensual) understandings about the purposes of the field, relationships to others in 
the field (including who has power and why), and the rules governing legitimate action 
in the field’ (Fligstein and McAdam, 2012, p. 9).
Not all actors converge on one opinion. Indeed, such complete consensus on artistic 
value is exceptional, and in the art market, it holds for only a small number of artists 
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canon of art history. Even in these cases, judgements of quality can change over time, 
as for instance the history of perceptions of the work of Caravaggio shows.
That opinions in the field do not fully converge is not surprising, given that there 
is no objective anchor for the assessment of quality.10 But reducing uncertainty only 
requires that there be convergence among some actors on the judgement of quality. 
Each node (artist) is observed by different actors, who each occupy a different pos-
ition in the field. Actors’ assessments reflect their position in the market; their interests, 
values and tastes; as well as what they pay attention to (Prato and Stark, 2012). This 
difference in judgements is the basis for the possibility of novel perceptions of artistic 
quality and the dynamics of the market. It is through the remaining dissent that new 
perceptions emerge (Stark, 2009). Evaluations are contingent, contested and subject 
to change. Seen from the investment side, the dissent in quality assessment is also a 
precondition for profits in the market: if everybody held the same assessment of what 
is valuable, buyers would suffer ‘the winner’s curse’ (Thaler, 1994) and earn nothing 
from their purchases.
Because judgements of quality are plural rather than fully identical, individuals need 
to form a position on their own when assessing the artistic value or the investment 
value of an artwork. But this valuation echoes the quality assessments in the field and 
changes in accordance with such assessments. Thus, valuations are never individu-
alistic, even though they are held by individuals. If quality assessments in the field 
change, so do preferences—at least in the aggregate—and with them, other things 
being equal, also the price for the artwork. Inclusion into the collection of a high-status 
collector, exhibition by a high-status museum, increased attention in the media or the 
sale of works at increased prices are examples of events that lead to changes in assess-
ment; they raise the position of the artist because they are read as signals of quality. 
At the same time, the position of an artist in the field needs to be continuously recon-
firmed. If this does not happen, the artist’s position in the field will decline. Changes 
in preferences are endogenously produced through the intersubjective practices of 
quality evaluation through which actors mutually observe each other.
Changes in the assessment of artists and the status of actors in the market field 
emerge from the continuous struggles for recognition among actors. Actors stand in 
competition in convincing other actors of their assessments. Future status and pecu-
niary gain depend on success in convincing others of one’s own assessment of quality. 
The different positions in the hierarchical order of the field distribute chances for 
influence unequally. Fluidity is created especially by the entry of new artists and new 
artistic styles, by the entry of new collectors, but also by the exit of intermediaries (e.g. 
gallery owners, art critics), which opens space for the entry of new actors and thus for 
shifts in the hierarchical order. Through these events, the market is constantly under-
going change, without questioning the general modus operandi of the market.
2.3 The markets from meaning model
Discursive practices and narratives infuse artworks with intersubjectively shared 
meanings that constitute their perceived quality and reduce uncertainty in the market. 
Quality reflects appreciations of the artistic worth of an artwork in the field of art. Value 
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reflects the subjective interpretation of the quality assessments communicated in the 
market; it refers to the quality assessments of actors and their willingness to pay a cer-
tain amount of money for the artwork (even if they have no intention of actually buying 
it). Price is the market outcome, emerging from quality assessments, assignment of 
value and further market factors such as purchasing power, transaction costs and the 
competitive structure of the market.
Figure 1 depicts the model. The position of an artist in the market is the outcome 
of the entirety of the judgements of that artist’s work. By means of interaction, actors 
interpret each other’s assessments and incorporate them into their own valuation. The 
weight of individual judgements is a function of their status in the market. Unlike in 
the market for lemons model, it is not the intrinsic characteristics of the object that 
constitute quality; rather, quality is an ascription.11 Any change in the assessment of 
quality strengthens or disconfirms the artist’s position in the field. In pragmatist terms, 
the sum of the assessments of an artist is the ‘generalised other’ (Mead, [1934] 1967), 
determining the quality (‘identity’ in Mead’s terms) of the artwork.
The quality assessment in the market informs individual judgements and the value 
ascribed to an artwork. Willingness to pay changes as quality assessments change. 
Current judgements, together with market structures and purchasing power, deter-
mine prices through the market mechanism. Prices, when read as quality signals, feed 
back into quality assessments and valuation. Quality, value and price are thus the out-
comes of ‘selves in interaction’ (Mead).
The process of quality assessment for products whose qualities are not intrinsic to the 
object is related to the concept of endogenous preferences (Bowles, 1998). Endogeneity 
means that preferences are not externally given and stable, but instead are affected by 
policies or institutional arrangements (Bowles, 1998, p. 75). Although the theory of 
endogenous preferences focuses on institutional arrangements and cultural contexts, 
11 See also Durkheim (1974, p. 86): ‘There are many instances in which no such relation exists between 
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the focus here is on the creation of contexts of meaning through intersubjective dis-
cursive engagement in the field. Individual intentions are, in the sense of Davis (2002), 
mediated by the intentions that actors attribute to the group to which they belong. The 
markets from meaning model also relate to the concept of interdependent utility func-
tions (Komlos and Salamon, 2005). However, it does not emphasise consequences 
for individual utility stemming from the distribution of a good (as it is the case for 
positional goods), but rather the interdependency of the quality assessment of goods. 
The feedback effect from prices on the assessment of quality picks up the analysis of 
bandwagon effects (Leibenstein, 1950) and the hot hand fallacy (Johnson et al., 2005).
3. Institutions
In the markets from meaning model, like in the markets for ‘lemons’ model, the assessment 
of quality is steadied through institutions. But the institutions tend to be of a different 
kind. As argued by Akerlof (1970), institutions that are enforceable by third parties can 
counteract market failure caused by information asymmetries. In consumer markets, 
product warranties are the most prominent example. These institutions function to 
produce trust, that is, the belief of the less informed party that it will not be cheated by 
the more knowledgeable party.
Such institutions play only a limited role in the markets from meaning model. They 
are significant for solving information problems in the market, and in the art market, 
one such problem is the authenticity of the artwork being sold. Buyers must be able to 
trust that the artwork is authentic. This trust is produced institutionally, for instance 
through expert reports by recognised authorities in the field and the transparency of 
the provenance of the artwork. These experts use institutionalised templates. If an art-
work turns out not to be authentic, that is, not the work of the artist the seller claims 
it is, the buyer has a recourse in the institutions of the legal system. Trust-producing 
institutions protect buyers from deception and fraud. Authenticity is an information 
problem. But this kind of problem plays no role in explaining the large price differ-
ences among artworks that have already been recognised as authentic.12
Institutions in the markets from meaning model serve primarily to produce not 
trust, but confidence. Confidence is the belief in the credibility of a narrative of the 
alleged quality of the product. By creating confidence in a multitude of actors, a nar-
rative becomes a convention. In this sense, what renders reputation to an artist is 
institutionalised. The reputation-generating power of a celebrated exhibition like the 
documenta in Kassel is institutionalised in the field, even though there is no legal stipu-
lation guaranteeing that this art show will influence the assessment of the quality of 
an artist exhibited there. A  loss in reputation of the documenta would be a process 
occurring over time, but at the current moment, actors can be confident that quality 
signals can be inferred from its selection of artists. The same holds for museums (e.g. 
MoMa), galleries (e.g. Saatchi), art prizes (e.g. the Turner prize) and art critics (e.g. 
Clement Greenberg). The position of these ‘judgment devices’ (Karpik, 2010) is ‘en-
trenched’ (Aspers, 2009). This entrenchment is the sediment of earlier discourse and 
produces confidence in quality assessments, reducing uncertainty and increasing 
12 Normally, authenticity is checked and taken for granted in transactions. However, if the authenticity of 
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buyers’ willingness to make purchases. It signals quality though no legal recourse is 
possible. The influence of such conventions takes place through the ‘anchoring’ of be-
haviour (Kahneman, 2011).
Confidence-enhancing institutionalisation also takes place through conventions that 
constitute ‘how-to’ rules. In the primary art market, for instance, the price of the work 
of an artist varies with the size and type of work (e.g. drawing, painting, sculpture). 
Larger works have a higher price, and oil paintings are more expensive than drawings. 
This holds despite quality differences between individual works and is an institutional-
ised convention to reduce uncertainty in the market (Velthuis, 2005).13
Further institutionalisation of quality assessment takes place through calculative 
devices. Databases such as artprice.com allow observing the development of auction 
prices for artists and make rankings possible which identify ‘undervalued’ and ‘over-
priced’ artists and thus provide orientation for purchasing decisions based on past 
transactions. They are calculative devices that are conventionally used in the market to 
judge market prices and help provide confidence in the legitimacy of prices for specific 
transactions or provide a critique of them.
4. Application to investment markets
The model exemplified by the market for contemporary art can easily be extended to 
the analysis of other markets where product value depends on judgements of aesthetic 
or moral criteria. Examples are the wine market (Podolny, 1993; Beckert and Rössel, 
2013), the market for fashion (Blumer, 1969; Aspers, 2006), the market for antiques 
(Bogdanova, 2013), the market for coffee (Fischer, 2017), the market for halal food 
(Van Waarden and van Dalen, 2013), the market for fair trade products (Bartley et al., 
2015) and the market for travel destinations (Bandelj and Wherry, 2011). If we under-
stand these markets as consumer markets, value is not linked to the expectations of 
future profits, but rather to the satisfaction of concrete needs.14 Uncertainty does not 
stem from asymmetric information, but from lack of clarity as to what qualifies as 
quality.15
Instead of describing these markets, however, where the similarities to the art market 
are not surprising, the remainder of this article will focus on capital investments and 
financial markets to show that the relevance of the model in analysing quality uncer-
tainty extends far beyond aesthetic and moral markets.
Similar to the case of evaluating aesthetic or moral qualities, investments and fi-
nancial speculation are characterised by quality uncertainty, which is not covered by 
the Akerlof model. This uncertainty, however, has a different source compared with 
the consumer markets mentioned above. It is caused not by the contingency of what 
13 This convention does not exist in the secondary market.
14 The art market is specific in the sense that both sources of uncertainty come together. The artistic value 
of an artwork is contingent, but so also is its future value. If the assessment of quality of an artwork is the 
basis for a purchasing decision that aims at financial gain from expected future selling of the artwork, or as a 
store of value, it also falls into the category of investment markets. This duality can even be found in markets 
that one would otherwise clearly define as consumer markets, not oriented towards future rewards but to-
wards current utility. Earl (2001) describes how the attendance of live music performances can have a future 
orientation because it may be possible to ‘dine out’ later on having attended the concert.
15 In other markets, like the market for cars or housing markets, asymmetric information (lemons model) 
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counts as quality, but by the impossibility of knowing what the profitability of the in-
vestment will be. Uncertainty is related to the openness and unpredictability of the 
future (see Table 1).
4.1 Capital investments
Investments in firms and financial assets are motivated by the goal of storing value 
and increasing it. The problem, which is to different degrees inherent in all invest-
ment decisions, can be illustrated by looking at venture capital investments. The firms 
seeking venture capital usually do not yet have a fully developed product, and neither 
product development nor market acceptance can be foreseen because of the newness 
and uniqueness of the product (Shapin, 2008, p.  269ff; Giraudeau, 2012, p.  213). 
Although venture capitalists try to calculate the outcome (future pay-offs) of their 
investment as precisely as possible to establish profitability of that investment, ‘these 
numbers are subject to significant assumptions and judgement and so are inherently 
subjective’ (Nama and Lowe, 2013, p. 33). Future cash flows and inherent risks simply 
cannot be known. Investment decisions thus have an uncertain future value due to 
the impossibility of correct calculations of future profits (i.e. the quality of the invest-
ment). As a consequence, decisions rather rely on opinion, or, more precisely, ‘upon 
the amount of confidence in that opinion’ (Knight, [1921] 2006, p. 227). Viewed from 
a Keynesian perspective, the price of capital assets varies with the optimism or pes-
simism of investors. Prices come about ‘through the continuous revaluation of the 
money price of existing assets by the market, due to changes in psychological expect-
ations’ (Townshend, 1937, p. 165). These psychological expectations, however, are not 
individual, but rather created intersubjectively in the field and are thus social in char-
acter. The process of intersubjective construction of expectations (quality assessments) 
can be described in terms of the markets from meaning model.
Though venture capital firms accept that the majority of investments will fail, they 
still try to identify those investment opportunities, which will make a profit.16 They do 
not invest randomly. How then do they evaluate the quality of an investment?
Entrepreneurs present their business plan and company vision to potential investors 
in pitches in which they expose themselves to scrutiny and questions. Assessments 
of firms’ future profitability are based on narratives that must be convincing. These 
Table 1. Sources of uncertainty in different markets. The art market entails characteristics of the 
lower left quadrant and the upper right quadrant
Uncertainty due to …
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narratives are offered in the business plan and are supported by calculation of fu-
ture returns. Calculations are used to demonstrate the profitability of the investment 
through the use of numbers and calculative models. Given the uncertainty of future 
outcomes, however, the numbers they show are based on un-confirmable assumptions 
regarding future states of the world. Their function is to create confidence in an in-
vestment through recourse to calculative tools that enjoy legitimacy in the community 
of entrepreneurs and investors. On their own, however, numbers cannot inspire deci-
sions. The credibility of the narrative told by the entrepreneur is based, in addition, on 
the entrepreneur’s ability to convey an impression of personal virtue and passion, and 
on networks of familiarity (Shapin, 2008). The assessment of prospective returns on 
an investment is anchored in ‘narrative embedding’ (Lane and Maxfield, 2005) which 
includes numbers, prospective stories and the observation of the reactions of other 
actors in the field. Events such as investment by a high-status hedge fund or the publi-
cation of a report from an influential analyst are observed by other potential investors 
and read as signals of quality that convey confidence in an investment narrative.
Viewed more broadly, an investment’s profitability is evaluated within a field that 
includes consultants, scientists, accountants, the media, economists, analysts, invest-
ment bankers, managers, entrepreneurs and capital owners. These actors assess an 
investment’s value by articulating expectations of future development discounted to 
present value (Doganova, 2011, p. 15). Assessments of quality emerge from imaginaries 
turned into narratives and combined with mathematical calculations, accounting con-
ventions, and available data (Shackle, 1972, p. 8). As in the art market, assessments 
float in the field and are mutually observed by actors in a system of reflecting mirrors 
(Moulin, 1986).
In these intersubjective processes, actors gain confidence in their imaginaries by lis-
tening to the accounts of others and revise their expectations as they deem necessary. 
Quality, in other words, is constituted in practical processes by means of the narrative 
staging of expected future returns and the associated risks. Like in the art market, 
actors do not fully converge in their opinions regarding the profitability of a specific 
investment opportunity. Assessments differ. The reason for this is incomplete and dis-
persed information, but the different positions in the market, which lead to a variety 
of interests and expectations, are also relevant (Richardson, 1960; Prato and Stark, 
2012). Such differences in the assessment of future opportunities are a precondition 
for the functioning of investment markets: If all investors would see the same pro-
spects, profits would be wiped out.
The evaluation underlying investment decisions is also the outcome of a social re-
lationship, in that assessments depend on the structural composition of the field, that 
is, on the relative position of the different actors. The investments of venture capital 
companies are mutually observed in the field and the investment by a high-status 
firm read by other firms as a signal to invest as well. Because imaginaries about the 
profitability of investments have distributive effects, interested actors may attempt 
to mobilise other actors around specific imaginaries or to detach others from them 
(Mützel, 2010). Their effectiveness in this depends on their symbolic and economic 
capital. Quality assessments may have immediate economic effects, by initiating in-
vestment or altering the costs of capital for firms. The latter is the case when positive 
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Business plans, models of capital budgeting and procedures of due diligence are 
conventions used to establish confidence in the quality of an investment opportunity. 
They are relevant not because they make it possible to foresee the future outcome of 
an investment, but because they are institutionalised tools within the community of 
experts charged with the valuation of investments that help cope with an uncertain 
future. They are devices that help to produce confidence.
4.2 Financial speculation
Like the art market and capital investments, financial markets are characterised by 
the quality uncertainty of their products. In financial markets, the quality of assets is 
determined by future income streams, volatility and the market price of the security 
at the end of the investment period. Thus, what constitutes quality is clearly defined, 
and value and price follow directly from perceived product quality. However, as in cap-
ital investments, the openness of the future prevents foreknowledge of which financial 
products will be most lucrative in hindsight.
Despite the similarity between capital investments and financial assets in terms of 
the unpredictability of their future value, there exists a difference between them that 
makes financial speculation an informative third illustrative case for the markets from 
meaning model. Capital investments are cases of what Keynes ([1936] 2006, p. 158) 
called enterprise; by contrast, most financial market transactions are a case of what he 
called speculation. In the first case, market actors try to forecast the prospective yield 
of an investment over its whole life; they are interested in its fundamental value. In the 
second case, they are interested in short-term gains and attempt to this end to forecast 
the psychology of the market.17
Keynes demonstrates what he means by ‘forecasting the psychology of the market’ 
with the famous analogy of a beauty contest in which the task is not to identify the 
prettiest face, but to forecast what the other competitors will think the prettiest face is. 
The analogy to financial speculation is that the quality of the security, that is, its prof-
itability as an investment, does not depend on its fundamental value but on market 
opinion. The more ‘the market’ thinks of the security, the higher its price. This implies 
that even if individual investors believe that the price for a security is too high in terms 
of its fundamentals, they will act rationally by continuing to buy it for as long as they 
believe that the other speculators will do the same (Orléan, 2014).
This is an interesting further case of the intersubjective constitution of quality and 
value. Quality uncertainty is reduced through (at least partial) convergence on an 
opinion regarding market development, not through convergence on an assessment of 
actual product quality. This claim contradicts the efficient market hypothesis (Fama, 
1965), which claims that financial assets have a fundamental or intrinsic value and that 
prices in financial markets oscillate around this fundamental value.18
17 This does not mean that speculation does not make recourse to fundamental value. This is done to 
identify market inefficiencies which can be exploited for short-term profits. Such arbitrage strategies are 
based on the collective belief that markets tend towards fundamental value. For these different investment 
strategies in financial markets, see also Ortiz (2014, p. 41).
18 According to the efficient market model, markets are self-correcting: they increase demand for assets 
that are ‘undervalued’ as measured by the ‘correct’ fundamental value of these assets. Financial markets thus 
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The markets from meaning model follows an opposite suggestion, namely ‘to 
abandon the idea that value enjoys some special sort of objectivity’ (Orléan, 2014, 
p. 189) and sees market price as depending on the contingent opinions of investors 
regarding the opinions of other market actors. Like in the art market, the assessed 
quality of financial securities as stores of value depends on collective beliefs that form 
intersubjectively in the market. The value of an asset is thus not anchored in something 
objectively given—fundamental value—but in the discursively established assessments 
by traders and their mutual observation. Implied volatility, a crucial measure to de-
termine the value of derivatives in structured finance, expresses ‘an estimate of the 
operators’ perception of future market movements’ (Esposito, 2018, p. 225). It thus 
measures what market actors think other market actors think, that is, reflects the senti-
ment of the market. It is not an assessment of the actual future volatility of a derivative, 
but rather of the collective belief in this volatility. This suggests that financial markets 
are ‘in essence … markets in stories’ (Tuckett, 2012, p. 21). Speculative investment is 
a matter of confidence in these stories where engagements arise from the discrepancy 
between the valuation of securities based on the perception of the prevailing opinion 
and the individual traders’ opinions.
As in the art market, quality uncertainty is reduced intersubjectively through mu-
tual observation and the emergence of partial consensus. The liquidity of the market 
rests on a collective belief, anchored in ‘the confidence that the financial commu-
nity places in it’ (Orléan, 2014, p. 209). As a consequence, financial markets are not 
automatically self-correcting at all, but can spiral into speculative bubbles and self-
reinforcing crises. This risk is especially high if market opinion is very homogenous 
(Beckert and Bronk, 2018).
In financial markets, as in the art market, assessments of quality are not stabilised 
primarily through institutions that aim to produce trust, but rather through institu-
tions that produce confidence. Such institutions include financial models. The efficient 
market hypothesis, for example, is a ‘how-to’ rule for the assessment of prices. Traders 
use the calculation of fundamental value, and the recognition of differences to actual 
market prices, as a heuristic device allowing them to find reasons for specific arbitrage 
trades (Miyazaki, 2003). The assessed ‘correct value’ is either a critique or a confirm-
ation of actual market prices. The mathematical models based on the efficient market 
hypothesis allow traders to find direction for their trades despite the uncertainty of 
the future. Examples of other institutionalised behaviours in financial markets are as 
follows: following market trends based on the assumption of the greater wisdom of 
crowds; giving authority to reports from analysts and credit rating agencies; and be-
lieving in dominant narratives (e.g. ‘the new economy’, the ‘Asian tigers’, ‘BRICS’). 
Such ‘valuation conventions’ (Orléan, 2014, p. 234) compensate for the impossibility 
of objectively calculating quality given the openness of the future. They stabilise con-
fidence in the assessment of quality for as long as the market collectively believes in 
them.19







PI Study of Societies user on 29 August 2019
Page 14 of 17  J. Beckert
5. Conclusion
This article contributes to the understanding of value and price by asking how as-
sessments of product quality emerge in markets. Buyers are only willing to engage in 
market transactions if they can establish the quality of the products offered. If quality 
relates to the intrinsic characteristics of a product, it can be objectively determined, 
for example, in the market for used cars or in standardised commodity markets. In 
these markets, actors might be confronted with problems of asymmetric information 
(Akerlof, 1970).
However, in many important markets, quality is not an inherent feature of the 
product or cannot be known in the present because of the uncertainty of future de-
velopment. In these cases, quality is based on contingent judgements through which 
actors in the field define quality. Two cases can be distinguished: quality can be un-
certain either because there is no objective standard as to what counts as quality or 
because the relevant qualities of the product can only be known in the future.
These features, leading to the indeterminacy of assessments of quality, hold in a 
surprisingly large set of markets: in those in which goods are valued for their aesthetic, 
moral or symbolic meanings. The art market was discussed as an illustrative example. 
Economically more important is the large range of markets for consumer products 
where products are not valued for their functional qualities alone, but also—and some-
times almost exclusively—for their symbolic meanings (Beckert, 2011). Examples are 
the car market, the market for consumer information technology, the fashion market 
and the market for tourism. In these markets, qualities become established through 
intersubjectively shared narratives, formed by mutual observations, advertising and 
branding, and also by the use of the product by consumers. For the latter case, in-
vestment markets, the article looked at capital investments and financial speculation 
where quality assessments are also the result of intersubjective processes. Markets for 
intellectual property rights and labour markets have similar features of future-related 
quality uncertainty (Eymard-Duvernay and Marchal, 1997).
Without the means to establish quality taxations and confidence in these assess-
ments, these markets would fail: demand would be erratic and prices low. The markets 
from meaning model argues that in these markets, uncertainty is reduced intersub-
jectively through narratives, which create cognitive overlaps in the field regarding the 
assessed quality of products. Confidence is discursively established (and destroyed) 
through the staking of validity claims on quality that are confirmed or challenged by 
other actors or future events. Uncertainty is also reduced through conventions and cal-
culative devices that are legitimated institutions recognised for their capacity to define 
commonly accepted qualities. In this process, symbolic and economic capital reflects 
power differences that provide different opportunities to actors depending on their 
position in the field. Not only buyers and sellers are market actors contributing to the 
assessment of quality, so are market intermediaries. Thus, markets are best analysed as 
fields (Bourdieu, [1992] 1996; Beckert, 2010; Fligstein and McAdam, 2012).
This article suggests that value and preferences are not exogenously given, and not 
the reflection of individual taste, but rather an endogenous outcome of the market 
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meaning that is created by ‘selves in action’. If quality uncertainty is fully embraced, 
and not just treated as an information problem, it provides the vantage point for a 
sociological model of economic value and price.
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